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In adult humans, decisions involving the choice and use of tools
for future events typically require episodic foresight. Previous
studies suggest some non-human species are capable of future
planning; however, these experiments often cannot fully exclude
alternative learning explanations. Here, we used a novel tool-use
paradigm aiming to address these critiques to test flexible
planning in 3- to 5-year-old children, in relation to executive
function and language abilities. In the flexible planning task,
children were not verbally cued during testing, single trials
avoided consistent exposure to stimulus–reward relationships,
and training trials provided experience of a predictable return of
reward. Furthermore, unlike most standard developmental
studies, we incorporated short delays before and after tool
choice. The critical test choice included two tools with equal
prior reward experience—each only functional in one apparatus.
We tested executive function and language abilities using several
standardized tasks. Our results echoed standard developmental
research: 4- and 5-year-olds outperformed 3-year-olds on the
flexible planning task, and 5-year-old children outperformed
younger children in most executive function and language tasks.
Flexible planning performance did not correlate with executive
function and language performance. This paradigm could be
used to investigate flexible planning in a tool-use context in
non-human species.
© 2020 The Authors. Published by the Royal Society under the terms of the Creative
Commons Attribution License http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/, which permits






































Future-oriented cognition is a critical part of human life. We spend a substantial amount of time on
considering, planning and preparing for future scenarios [1]. Decisions involving the use of tools for a
future event typically require episodic foresight, i.e. the ability to imagine future scenarios, and
flexible planning outside of the present moment [2]. Children younger than 4 years appear to have
difficulties in foreseeing future events and choosing correct items to address their future needs (for a
review, see [3,4]).
Previous studies indicate that children’s foresight ability undergoes important changes during
preschool years [5]. Studies have shown that 4- and 5-year-olds were able to link past events from
15 min ago to deferred future problems and to select the correct tool in the present to solve the
anticipated problems [6–8]. In contrast, 3-year-olds could only choose the appropriate tool to address
needs that were of immediate concern, indicating that the delay between past event and future-directed
action influenced children’s performance. Subsequent research investigated children’s performance with
different lengths of delay and reported similar findings. Three-year-olds were only successful in
choosing the correct tool to address their current needs but failed to select the correct tool to address
their future needs [9–11]. Foresight is an important part of flexible planning, and although most
research indicates that 4-year-olds pass flexible planning tests, Dickerson and colleagues found that this
may be related to the type of task used [12]. In this study, the flexible planning task aimed to control
for the association between a choice and its salience, by presenting children with a choice of two high-
value objects after seeing a specific problem. Only one object could be used to solve the observed
problem. Four-year-olds failed to pass the test, while 5- to 7-year-olds passed it. Hence, the authors
suggested that 4-year-olds may use a simpler mechanism to solve prior flexible planning experimental
tasks without necessarily possessing flexible planning ability. Specifically, positively associated objects
may be chosen even in the absence of a possible future event [12].
Previous research that required a language component has suggested that failure in flexible planning
may be attributed to a limited understanding of language [13]. Thus, non-linguistic behavioural-based
paradigms have been widely adopted in developmental research [14]. Specifically, researchers have
designed tasks to assess the ability to use past information to prepare current actions for a future
problem in both young children and other animals [7,8,15]. For example, corvids (members of the
crow family) have shown impressive flexible planning skills in caching tasks, for example in learning
what to cache and what not to cache based on the foods available at the time of cache recovery
[15–21]. Studies on corvids and other species have also indicated flexible planning behaviours beyond
natural behavioural predispositions, i.e. outside of the caching context [22–27]. Recently, ravens were
shown to be able to plan for future tool use and barter with delays up to 17 h [22].
However, some of the non-human studies face several critiques relating to possible learning
explanations [28]. Namely, the use of multiple trials could reinforce the repeated exposure to the same
stimulus–reward relationship. Additionally, by pairing a non-functional tool with a non-reward
situation, participants might choose the correct tool based on its desirability and prior reward history,
rather than flexibly thinking about the future [28]. Importantly, influential experimental criteria have
been proposed to guide the design of behavioural tests measuring flexible planning in human and
other animals [7,29]. Notably, researchers recommended the use of single trials and novel problems to
separate the temporal and spatial contexts between the present future-oriented decision and the
anticipated future problem. Note that for Kabadayi and Osvath’s [22] study, the same task was used
during training and testing, rather than a novel problem that precludes learning. Furthermore, the
ravens were not given any prior reason to expect to use the selected items in a future event [28].
Therefore, the aim of our study was to design a novel experimental paradigm that addresses some of
the critiques of some previous related human and non-human studies in order to test flexible planning in
young children. It was important that our novel methodology could potentially be used comparatively to
test non-human species, thereby addressing the critiques mentioned above. Differences in testing
methodologies, such as the number and length of delays [30] can make it difficult to make
comparisons between human and non-human studies. Therefore, we ensured that the apparatus and
trials were designed in such a way that they could be used with humans as well as animals, such as
tool-using corvids. Within this novel flexible planning task, we aimed to test delay of gratification by
asking children to choose between an immediately available reward of lower quality or a tool to
obtain a delayed reward of higher quality. Importantly, we also provided training trials with delays to









































development studies, we incorporated two delays to be in line with most non-human animal research—
one delay following apparatus presentation, before the critical tool choice and one delay after the tool
choice before tool use. This was different from most previous child studies that incorporated delays
(e.g. 5 min to 24 h) only between the problem and selection, though no delay between selection and
use [7,9]. In the testing trials, children were asked to choose between two tools for which they had
equal prior positive stimulus–reward experience, only one of which was functional in a particular
condition.
We tested whether 3- to 5-year-old human children could use information from past events to guide
their present choice to address anticipated future problems. The aim being to validate our novel flexible
planning paradigm by first testing children, where there is already extensive established flexible planning
developmental research using other paradigms. We aimed to explore performance in this novel flexible
planning task in relation to performance in standardized executive function and language ability tasks as
part of this validation.
As Redshaw and Suddendorf [8] noted, planning for an immediate problem is less difficult than for a
deferred future problem as the latter requires more executive resources. Executive function refers to a set
of higher-order cognitive abilities which regulate goal-directed actions and adaptive responses in novel
and complex situations [31]. Adopting factorial analytic approach, researchers have identified three key
components of executive factors in adults: inhibitory control, working memory and cognitive flexibility
[32]. One model, influenced by the work of Miyake et al. [32], along with other developmental research,
indicates that in young children, executive function may be a more unitary construct comprising
inhibition, working memory and cognitive shifting/flexibility—though driven primarily by inhibitory
control [31,32]. Notably, inhibition and cognitive flexibility may be the most relevant cognitive
functions that underlie episodic foresight, as flexible planning requires the need to focus on the
simulated events, while suppressing ongoing events in the present [33]. Research on the development
of executive function further suggests that in early childhood individuals vary greatly in their
performance on a range of tasks tapping into different aspects of executive function, yet these
measures can be loaded onto a single latent factor in early development and in the preschool year
[34,35]. For the current study, we chose five age-sensitive and appropriate executive function tasks
aiming to measure inhibitory control (two tasks), cognitive flexibility (shifting) (one task) and working
memory (two tasks) as well as one language ability task.
Children’s executive function emerges throughout preschool years and a theoretical relation with
episodic foresight has been suggested [36,37]. Similarly, children’s language ability has been
associated with future thinking skills. A few studies empirically investigated these links and yielded
mixed findings [38–40]. For example, Unal and Hohenberger [38] gave 3- to 5-year-old children an
episodic memory and an episodic future thinking task, as well as three tasks to measure temporal
language, executive function (inhibition) and spatial working memory. They found that after
controlling for age, performance on the episodic memory and episodic future thinking task were
correlated, and scores on the executive function and language task correlated with the episodic
memory task, while only the language task results correlated with the episodic flexible planning task.
Ford and colleagues [40] gave 4- to 6-year-old children a prospective memory task, as well as one task
assessing verbal ability, five tasks assessing inhibitory control, one task assessing working memory, six
tasks assessing theory of mind and one task assessing empathy. Theory of mind is defined as the
ability to understand and attribute mental states to self and others and requires the change of
perspectives [41]. Four out of the five inhibitory control tasks were highly correlated. They found that
an aggregate score from the inhibitory control tasks, as well as an aggregate score from the theory of
mind tasks, predicted the children’s performance on the prospective memory task.
In another study, Hanson and colleagues [39] gave 3- to 5-year-old children a battery of five tasks
measuring episodic foresight and seven tasks measuring the key aspects of executive function, namely,
inhibitory control, cognitive flexibility, planning generativity and working memory. After controlling
for age and language, they found that the executive function scores (individually or as a composite
score) were not correlated with episodic foresight [39]. Given that previous studies have used children
of different age groups, different tasks and different methods of analysis and found conflicting results,
the relationship between executive function, language ability and flexible planning requires further
investigation.
Thus, our aim was to test flexible planning in young children using a novel task that could be used
comparatively and addressed some of the critiques of previous non-human animal paradigms. We then
examined the relationship between flexible planning and executive function and language performance.









































age to positively influence performance in these tasks, as per prior research. With our novel flexible
planning task, we expected a significant age difference between 3-year-olds and older children, in line
with previous child developmental research using standard flexible planning paradigms. Finally, we
expected performance in the executive function, language ability and the flexible planning task to
correlate positively with one another across and within each age group.
2. Methods
2.1. Participants
Participants were 87 children aged between 3 and 5 years old: 30 3-year-olds (mean: 3.82 years; range:
3.3–3.99 years), 28 4-year-olds (M: 4.53 years; R: 4.03–4.99 years) and 29 5-year-olds (M: 5.49 years; R:
5.1–5.88 years), of which 44 were male and 43 were female. Children were recruited and tested at five
nurseries and primary schools in Cambridgeshire, with piloting completed at two additional schools,
serving predominantly white, middle-class communities between February and March 2018.
Participants were presumed to be typically developing children (an assumption supported by the
teaching staff at the facilities). All children in this sample had previously been tested in a second
study using a tool-use task with no flexible planning element [42]. Children were tested in temporary
visual isolation from other people, or, for some of the younger children, with a staff member present
who did not interact with the child. Eighty-seven children took part in the flexible planning task and
the language task, 86 children took part in the dimensional change card sort (DCCS) and forwards
digit task, 85 children took part in the day–night task and 84 children took part in the knock-tap and
the backwards digit span tasks.
2.2. Flexible planning task
2.2.1. Apparatus
We used three different apparatuses—each apparatus had one type of functional tool, with the tools
selected to be familiar to the participants (figure 1). The horizontal tube apparatus (figure 1a) comprises
a transparent tube with two open ends. The reward rested in the centre of the tube and could be
retrieved by inserting a pencil to rake or push the reward through either opening. The drop-down
apparatus (figure 1b) comprises a transparent box with a collapsible platform and an open vertical tube.
Dropping a stone of sufficient weight into the vertical tube caused the platform to collapse and release
the reward. The feeder apparatus (figure 1c) was remotely controlled by the experimenter, and dropping
a paperclip into a designated tube would release the reward. We used stickers for the most preferred
(picture sticker) and least preferred (white sticker) rewards, with a medium quality sticker (yellow
smiley sticker) for some parts of the pre-experience steps. Trials were timed with a stop-watch, and we
used two separate locations (A and B), which were either two adjacent rooms or two areas separated by
visual barriers, depending on the space available at each school.
(a) (b) (c)











































Participants were tested in two sessions: in session 1, participants received several pre-experience steps
and in session 2, participants received training and test trials. Session 1 lasted 8–10 min and was run in
the same order for all participants. Session 2 lasted approximately 30 min and condition order was
counterbalanced across participants. Eighty of the 87 test participants received the training and test
session on the same day with a minimum interval of 1 h. Due to school arrangement and availability
of participants, 7 children received the test session 1 or 2 days after the training session.
2.2.3. Session 1 (pre-experience phase)
Step 1, tool transport: participants were asked to select a tool in location A and then use it immediately on
an apparatus in location B. They were not required to make a choice as only the functional tool was
presented, and they received one trial per apparatus. The apparatuses were baited with the medium
quality reward.
Step 2, reward preference test: participants were asked to select the ‘best’ sticker from a choice
between the most and least preferred options. The stickers were presented in front of the participants
and the position (right/left) of the stickers was counterbalanced across trials. The reward preference
task was conducted twice, with one trial during the pre-experience phase in session 1 and one trial at
the end of testing in session 2. All children preferred the picture stickers over the white stickers.
Step 3, delay of gratification: the drop-down apparatus was baited with the most preferred reward
and participants were presented with a choice between the least preferred reward and the functional
tool (stone). Participants were required to select the tool to access the most preferred reward over the
immediately available least preferred reward in two consecutive trials. If they failed to select the tool
in these two trials they received two additional trials before proceeding to the next step.
Step 4, tool functionality: the medium reward was placed inside one of the three apparatuses and
participants were asked to select the functional tool from a choice of two tools (one functional, one
non-functional). Participants received two trials per apparatus, with three additional trials run if they
failed, i.e. selected the incorrect tool in any of the previous trials, starting with the apparatus that they
failed on. The presentation order of apparatuses and the location of tools were counterbalanced across
participants and trials.
2.2.4. Session 2 (training and test trials)
Participants received two training conditions and two test conditions, with one trial per condition
(table 1). The training conditions provided participants with experience of a predictable return of
reward situation in a future event. The test trials investigated whether participants could select the
correct tool to solve an anticipated future problem. In each condition, participants were first shown
the baited apparatus in location a (figure 2, steps b1, c1, d1 and e1). Participants then waited in location
b for a set delay time, after which they could select one of two items (training trials: tool or reward,
test trials: choice between a functional and a non-functional tool) to use later (figure 2, steps b2, c2, d2
and e2). After a second delay, they returned to location a and could use this item to try to access the
reward from the apparatus (figure 2, steps b3, c3, d3 and e3). In the training conditions, the reward
inside the apparatus was either high quality or low quality, and the children made a choice between
Table 1. Training and test conditions for flexible planning task.
condition 1 2 3 4
trial type training training test test




most preferred least preferred most preferred most preferred






























































Figure 2. Procedure of training and test trials for flexible planning task. (a) General set-up: experimenter and participant in room 1,
apparatus out-of-sight in room 2. Step 1: in room 2, participant has visual access for 10 s to apparatus containing reward (training:
(b) most preferred reward in drop-down apparatus, (c) least preferred in drop-down apparatus; testing: (d ) most preferred in
horizontal tube apparatus, (e) most preferred in feeder apparatus). Step 2: after a delay, participant makes choice of tool or
tool/sticker in room 1 (training: (b) choice = stone versus least preferred reward, (c) stone versus most preferred reward;
testing: (d,e) stick versus paperclip. Step 3: after a delay, participant has access to baited apparatus in room 2—can bring









































the corresponding reward and the functional tool (figure 2, conditions b and c). In the training conditions,
though not in the test conditions, we incorporated a short verbal cue prior to the item choice, indicating
that we would be returning to location a later.
In the test conditions, the most preferred reward was inside the horizontal tube or remote-controlled
feeder apparatus (figure 2, conditions d and e). Participants had no prior experience of a delay between
tool choice and use for these two test apparatuses, though they were otherwise equally familiar with
these apparatuses and their respective tools from session 1 pre-experience (figure 2). They therefore
had comparable experience of obtaining a reward using each tool with each apparatus. In the test
conditions, the same two tools were presented in each trial (pencil and paperclip); therefore, one tool
was correct in one condition and the other tool was correct in the other condition. In all conditions,
we incorporated two delays of different length between steps 1–2 and steps 2–3 (2 and 5 min;
figure 2). Participants were split into two subgroups with half of the participants per age in each one:
subgroup A received a 2 then 5min delay; subgroup B received a 5 then 2min delay, with the delay
order consistent across conditions within participant. The order of conditions within training and
testing conditions was counterbalanced across participants. Testing was conducted by R.M., A.F. and
N.D., following a script and prior training by R.M. The electronic supplementary material, Movie
shows example clips of testing.
2.3. Executive function and language tasks
We conducted several executive function tasks designed to test inhibition, cognitive flexibility and
working memory, and a language ability measure (table 2). Specifically, these were: (1) inhibition =
knock-tap, day–night, (2) cognitive flexibility = DCCS, (3) working memory = forwards and
backwards digit span, and (4) receptive language = British picture vocabulary scale. We outline the
task administration protocols further in the electronic supplementary material. We ran these tasks
within the delays in the flexible planning task, in a set order within subgroups A and B.
2.4. Data analysis
We recorded the choice per trial for each participant as ‘correct’ or ‘incorrect’. All test sessions were coded
live as well as being video-recorded unless parental consent requested otherwise. Ten percent of trials
were coded from video and compared with the live coding, finding 100% agreement with the data.
We conducted generalized linear mixed models (GLMM: [48]) using R version 3.6.1 [49] to assess which
factors influenced success rate in the flexible planning task in children. Success was a binary variable
indicating whether the participant correctly solved the trial (1) or not (0) and was entered as a
dependent variable in the models. We included the random effect of participant ID, fixed effects of age
in years (continuous: ages 3–5 in individual years), condition (1–2 training, 3–4 for testing), gender
(male/female), delay order (short-long delay/ long-short delay) and training performance (solved—1,
not solved—0, for model 1 only). We ran two separate models: (1) test trials and (2) training trials. We
used likelihood ratio tests to compare the full model (all predictor variables, random effects and control
variables) firstly with a null model, and then with reduced models to test each of the effects of interest
[50]. The null model consisted of random effects, control variables and no predictor variables. The
reduced model comprised all effects present in the full model, except the effect of interest [51]. We then
ran further post hoc comparisons using exact Mann–Whitney U-tests and Wilcoxon signed-rank tests.
Using R [49], we also assessed whether age had an effect on each executive function task and
language ability using Kruskal–Wallis tests from the pastecs package [52]. We then ran post hoc tests
for the Kruskal–Wallis tests to examine how the age groups differed using the pgirmess package [53].
We tested whether individuals’ success on the flexible planning test correlated with their score in each
of the executive function and language ability tasks, using Spearman correlations, with a Bonferroni
correction, in the psych package [54].
3. Results
3.1. Children’s performance in the flexible planning task
In the test trials, the full model differed significantly from the null model (χ2 = 11.46, d.f. = 5, p = 0.04). We









































with success increasing with age (electronic supplementary material, table S1). Specifically, 3-year-olds
performed significantly more poorly than 4- and 5-year-olds (Mann–Whitney U-test: 3 versus 4 years:
U = 1344, z =−2.24, p = 0.032: 3 versus 5 years: U = 1407, z =−2.16, p = 0.035), with no significant
difference in success rate between 4- and 5-year-olds (U = 1610, z =−0.105, p > 0.999). In the test trials,
3-year-old children did not significantly select correctly above chance, while children aged 4 and 5
years did significantly select correctly above chance (table 3, electronic supplementary material, table S2).
Table 2. Task descriptions for executive function and language ability.
task Description
inhibition knock-tap [43] Participants were asked to perform the opposite hand movement from
the experimenter, so if the experimenter knocked on the table, the
subject should tap the table with their flat palm and vice versa.
The number of correct responses (out of 15 trials) was recorded.
day–night [44] Participants were first asked to identify the day (picture of a sun) and
night cards (picture of a moon), then were asked to say ‘day’
when shown the night card and ‘night’ when shown the day card.
Cards were shown individually in random order, and the number of
correct responses (out of 16 trials) was recorded.
cognitive
flexibility
DCCS [45] Participants were asked to sort 12 cards in each set based on a rule
for example colour of the pictures shown on the cards. After six
cards, the rule was then switched so that they were required to
sort by a different rule, for example shape. Half the participants
started with colour and switched to shape, and half started with
shape and switched to colour. The number of correct responses in
the post-switch phase was scored.
working
memory
forwards digit span Participants were asked to repeat a series of single digits in order
after they were read out by the experimenter. For example, 6–9,
5–8–2, 5–2–8–3, 1–3–6–2–9. The highest number of digits
recalled was recorded.
backwards digit span [46] Participants were asked to repeat a series of single digits in reverse
order after they were read out by the experimenter. For example,






Participants were asked to identify pictures corresponding to spoken
words from the experimenter. Each participant received a number
of vocabulary sets depending on their language ability. Raw and
standardized scores were calculated using the manual.























3 1.10 ± 0.66 10.79 ± 5.66 3.62 ± 1.76 10.95 ± 4.90 4.00 ± 0.87 1.28 ± 0.59 56.96 ± 14.58
4 1.50 ± 0.51 13.07 ± 3.54 4.50 ± 1.77 12.61 ± 4.16 4.39 ± 0.69 1.73 ± 0.83 62.96 ± 13.07









































In the training trials, the full model differed significantly from the null model (χ2 = 36.59, d.f. = 2,
p≤ 0.001). We found a significant main effect of condition (χ2 = 6.44, d.f. = 1, p = 0.011) on success rate
(correct versus incorrect choice) in the two training trials (electronic supplementary material, table S3).
In condition 1, the least preferred reward was inside the apparatus, and the choice was between the
most preferred reward and the functional tool with the correct choice being the immediately available
reward. In condition 2, the most preferred reward was inside the apparatus, and the choice was between
the least preferred reward and functional tool, with the correct choice being the immediately available
tool. Across all ages, children showed significantly higher success in condition 2 than 1 (Wilcoxon
signed-rank test: Z =−2.33, p = 0.029). In the training trials, children aged 3–5 years significantly selected
correctly above chance (electronic supplementary material, table S2).
3.2. Children’s performance in executive function and language ability tasks
Age had a significant effect on all executive function scores and language ability score, except for the
knock-tap task (table 3, electronic supplementary material, table S4). Five-year-olds outperformed 3-
year-olds except on the forwards digit task (all p < 0.05). Additionally, 5-year-olds scored significantly
higher on the backwards digit span task and language ability than 4-year-olds (all p < 0.05). Across all
ages and within the executive function tasks only, performance in the knock-tap task correlated with
numbers forwards digits task, DCCS correlated with day–night and numbers backwards digits, day–
night correlated with numbers forwards digit, and numbers forwards digits correlated with numbers
backwards digit task (table 4). Language performance correlated with all executive function tasks
except the knock-tap task (table 4).
3.3. Relationship between executive function tasks, language ability and flexible planning
task performance
Across all ages, we found that performance in the flexible planning task was not correlated with any of
the executive function or language ability tasks (table 4). Within age groups, performance in the flexible
planning task did not correlate with any executive function or language ability measures for any of the
age groups (electronic supplementary material, table S5).
4. Discussion
In the current study, we used a novel behavioural paradigm featuring different types of tools, rewards
and apparatuses to examine young children’s ability to use past information to solve a future
problem. We then related performance in the flexible planning task with several executive function
and language ability tasks. Specifically, in the flexible planning task, the children were presented with
apparatuses containing a reward in location 1. The findings revealed significant age-related differences
in flexible planning, executive function and language performance. In the flexible planning task,
children aged 4 and 5 successfully linked past events to deferred future episodes and made future-
directed decision in this tool-use context, while 3-year-olds were unable to do so. We found similar
age-related differences in children’s performance in the executive function and language tasks. While
performance in many of these tasks correlated with each other, there was no correlation between
performance in any executive function and the flexible planning task. Similarly, language ability was
also not correlated with performance in the flexible planning task.
Our results were consistent with most previous research which reported similar developmental
trajectory of flexible planning skills using standard child development paradigms [7,8,13,55]. There
was no relationship between delay length and performance in the flexible planning task. Notably,
unlike other paradigms, we incorporated two delays. In our study, half of the participants waited
2 min and the other half waited 5 min in the first delay. This was different to most previous child
studies that incorporated delays (e.g. 5 min to 24 h) between the problem and selection, though no
delay between selection and use [7,9]. In comparison, non-human studies typically include a delay
after the selection phase, though not before [30]. As we aimed for this paradigm to be useful for
comparative work, we included delays both prior and following the critical selection stage. Atance
and Sommerville [9] also explored the effect of a delay between selection and use in children and
found no effect on performance in 4-year-olds, though they did not test 3-year-olds. In our study, we


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































could pose adequate difficulty for 3-year-olds. This finding is in line with most previous child
development work where 3-year-olds were only able to solve problems that were of immediate
concern, reflecting difficulty linking past events to deferred future episodes [7,8].
Most research indicates that 4-year-olds pass flexible planning tests, including the present study.
However, Dickerson and colleagues found that, when presenting participants with a choice of two
high-value objects after seeing a specific problem, 4-year-olds failed to pass the test [12]. In our study,
the choice in the test trials was similarly between two objects of equal value, only one of which was
functional in a particular condition, and we found that 4-year-olds did pass the tests, though notably
with a short delay. The next step would be to further manipulate delay length and include other
possible options within the choice that have similar value, like tools that are rewarded in other
contexts or immediately available rewards.
We ran this study with the aim of testing flexible planning in young children using a novel paradigm
that addressed some of the key critiques of non-human animal studies, and relating flexible planning
performance to performance in executive function and language tasks. The current study therefore has
several methodological advantages with this flexible planning task. First of all, we used a single trial
design to avoid repeated reward-stimulus relationships. Participants received one test trial for each
apparatus to assess their tool choice specific to that condition. Secondly, children had equal experience
with both tools being functional as the paperclip and pencil had been equally associated with reward
in the pre-experience phase. Thus, there was no difference in desirability of tools and the correct
choice in test trials depended on the apparatus presented. Therefore, the task effectively tapped into
children’s ability of linking past information (type of apparatuses) to future-directed decisions (type of
tools). We used training trials to establish the experience of predictable return of future reward, which
allowed us to attribute children’s performance on tool selection to future-directed cognitive processes.
As recommended by previous research, we used a single trial for each condition, and novel problems
in the test sessions compared to the training sessions which precludes learning [7,29]. Additionally,
unlike most developmental research, we did not use verbal cues during testing making the current
paradigm potentially suitable for comparative studies. Limitations of this study include the cross-
sectional design, a sample drawn only from the UK with no monitoring or attempt to diversify
socio-economic status, and seven out of the 87 children were tested on a different day for the training
sessions. Future studies may test children multiple times at different ages to measure the development
of inhibition and executive function within each participant. Finally, as the children performed
similarly in our flexible planning task as in previous developmental studies [14], this may indicate
validity of this novel paradigm for testing flexible planning in other species, specifically corvids, such
as tool-using New Caledonian crows, or primates.
We also examined the relationship between children’s flexible planning, executive function and
language ability. We adopted a battery of standardized executive function measures and found, as
expected by previous research [56], significant effects of age on performance, except for in the knock-
tap task. Across all ages, several executive function measures were significantly correlated with one
another and with the language ability measure. Previous research found correlations between flexible
planning tasks and language ability, and these tasks had a high reliance on language in their flexible
planning tasks [38,40]. Our data showed correlations in performance between the children’s language
ability and all executive function tasks apart from the knock-tap task, which was the only task that
did not require language. Our flexible planning task was primarily non-verbal in the test trials and
flexible planning performance did not correlate with language ability in any age group. This indicates
that this task may be used with non-verbal species as well, making it easily comparable.
We found no significant relationship between flexible planning performance and executive function
measures across all ages, which may be due to the nature of our flexible planning task, as other studies
also found no inter-correlations between flexible planning and executive function task performance using
a different test paradigm [39]. As suggested in Hanson and colleagues’ study [39], it is possible that the
association between executive function and episodic foresight may only exist in flexible planning tasks
that feature conflicts between present and future states. However, Ford and colleagues [40] found a
correlation between inhibitory control and flexible planning, using two tasks that are similar to the
knock-tap task: the hand shape task and the tapping task.
One model indicates that executive function may be a unitary construct with partially dissociable
components [32,34,35,57,58] including inhibition, working memory and cognitive shifting/flexibility—
though driven primarily by inhibitory control [31,32]. In previous studies, different tasks have been
used to measure these three components, which may explain the variation in results. Some studies









































executive function and flexible planning (e.g. [39]). This may contribute to the lack of correlation between
executive function and flexible planning that has been found in some previous research, as despite
correlating with one another, it is possible that only specific aspects of executive function, like
inhibition, may correlate with performance in some flexible planning tasks. In training trials for the
flexible planning task, children of all ages were able to inhibit the selection of an immediately
available low-value reward for a tool in order to obtain a higher value reward inside the apparatus.
They could also correctly select the high-value reward when it was immediately available. However,
they did perform better when the high-value reward was inside the apparatus and the correct choice
was the tool, indicating that children of all ages showed a general interest in tool use. Therefore, it is
likely that tool use itself was rewarding for the participants, indicating that step 3 in session 1 and the
training steps in session 2 may not have measured delay of gratification, but rather the participants’
ability to make a correct choice when presented with two options.
In conclusion, we used a novel experimental paradigm to test flexible planning ability in children,
which could be run comparatively with other non-human species, while addressing critiques of some
previous related animal studies. We then related flexible planning performance to performance in
several standardized executive function and language tasks. The flexible planning task appeared to
successfully tap into pre-schoolers’ ability of mentally linking past events to deferred future events
and to make future-directed decisions. We detected significant age-related differences in performance
in children’s flexible planning ability and the developmental trajectory echoed those from standard
developmental studies. These findings indicate that this may be a valid test for exploring flexible
planning in the context of tool use in humans and other species.
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